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Abstract
In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for
implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and
empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical
assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value
Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As
empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration
between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of
relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is
obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical
solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an
important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance
structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research
about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example,
R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.
Key words: Collaboration, Technological Innovation, R&D, Technological Center.
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5INTRODUCTION
The adoption of an innovative attitude by firms is considered as a basic step for reaching competitive
advantages and surviving in an environment characterized by constant changes, market globalization
and increased competition. This innovative attitude must imply different scopes: the organizational one,
the commercial one and finally the technological one. If we focus on the latter, technological
innovation (TI) will be defined as the process that allows firms to attain new products, processes or
services (radical innovation) or, alternatively, significant technological improvements (incremental
innovation) 2. This TI process finishes when a new (or improved) product or service is introduced into
the market, or a new (or improved) process is used in the production system. That is why we would like
to state that, while the innovation process could be produced within multiple institutions (Universities,
Public Research Centers, Technological Centers, other firms, etc.), the end of the process must be
achieved inside the firm.
This paper is focused on the collaboration agreements for reaching innovation. More precisely, we shall
stress collaborations between firms and Technological Centers. Behind this selection there are
empirical and theoretical motivations.
The empirical motivation is found in the fit of this strategy for a majority of firms acting in the
industrial sector in Spain: the small and medium sized firms (SMEs)3. If we consider that an SME is
one with fewer than 250 workers, we would find that 99.7% of the Spanish firms fit this category in
1998. Furthermore, these firms contracted 63% of workers of the industrial Spanish sector (Source:
Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales,1999).
                                                       
2 It is a definition quite close to the definition presented in the Spanish “Plan Nacional de I+D+I 2000-2003”, and it does
not differ much from the ones provided by Schumpeter (1934), Stoneman (1983) or, more recently, Padmore et al. (1998).
3 Reports presented by OCDE and/or the COTEC Foundation and the “Plan Nacional de I+D+I 2000-2003” point out this
interest.
6About the Technological  Centers perspective, it can be observed how the importance of these
institutions is increasing in Spain. Approximately 55 Technological  Centers are integrated into the
Spanish Federation of Innovation Entities (Federación Española de Entidades de Innovación), they
attend more than 53,700 clients (1,540 are stable collaborators), have almost 2,680 full – time workers
and their joint bill exceeded 30,000 million pesetas in 1999, generating activities assessed in 331,000
million pesetas (Source: FEDIT, 2000). Compared with the situation in 1980 when there were only 250
full - time workers and their combined bill did not reach 1,000 million, one can see that the growth and
the relative weight of these institutions are rapidly increasing.
Concerning the theoretical motivation, it is found in the contractual and ownership issues of the
agreements between Technological  Centers (TC) and firms. This research line, initiated by Aghion and
Tirole (1994a, 1994b), attempts to explain how the allocation of property rights of the innovations
could affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations. It also affects the allocation of
control in the innovative process and the monetary compensations in play. However, their theoretical
proposal is based on a particular conception of the relationship TC – firm. That is, a small and cash-
constrained TC, which is developing an R&D project with a high level of uncertainty. In this paper a
heterogeneous typology of contractual relationships among Technological Centers and firms shall be
analyzed. Based on the analysis of four contracts we shall propose a theoretical framework amplifying
the one used for explaining the selection of governance structures: a combination of Transaction Cost
and Property Rights Theories.
The study is organized as follows: the first section presents the theoretical framework, while the second
focuses on the empirical part of our research. The third section contains a discussion about the
observed results and the proposal for a theoretical way for future development. We finish with the main
conclusions of the study.
71. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Initially, the firm (vertical integration, unified property) and the market (separability, scattered
property) were considered the two pure and single forms of governing activities (Coase, 1937; Arrow,
1969, Williamson, 1975). The main difference between both pure forms is that all the needed
information for governing one activity using the market is contained in the price, while price does not
appear when the firm is the governance structure and the authority becomes the relevant aspect.
Due to the fact that the existence of an external price is the main difference between both structures, the
market is only possible as a governance structure for governing any activity when the characteristics of
the activity allow for establishing the price. That is why different authors, basically those related to the
Transaction Cost Theory, have been focusing on the characteristic attributes of the activity for
determining which one will be the governance structure finally selected4. Milgrom and Roberts (1992),
following Williamson (1975, 1985) and other authors (for example, Klein et. al., 1978), identify the
following characteristics of activities as really important in determining the governance structure
selected:
1. Specificity of assets related to the activity.
2. Frequency and duration of the activity.
3. Uncertainty about the conditions in the future and the impossibility of describing them.
4. Difficulties for assessing the results of the activity.
5. Interrelation with other activities.
Williamson suggests that the uncertainty, jointly with asset specificity, create the conditions for a
substitution of the market. Therefore, in those activities presenting the characteristics mentioned above,
the market is not a valid option: bounded rationality prevents the market as a governance structure
                                                       
4 They also mention two characteristics of individuals: bounded rationality and opportunism.
8because the lack of information demands a prediction and precision capacity transcending the limits of
rationality. Under these circumstances, is the firm the only alternative? Does unified ownership always
substitute the market in the government of transactions? We find the answer in the real world: for
organizing activities presenting some of the characteristics mentioned before, to arrive at the hierarchy
is not always necessary. We could use intermediate forms of organization. Williamson (1991)
recognizes that the firm and the market are indeed two extreme forms in  a continuum of structures.
The structures between both extremes are identified as “hybrids”, or collaboration agreements, because
they combine principles and rules owned by each pure form, firm and market ( Imai and Itami, 1984).
Some of them are going to present more market characteristics, in the sense that many things related to
the activity could be foreseen and then it is possible to specify a contract (referred to here as contractual
agreements); while others are going to present more hierarchy characteristics, in the sense that to
specify a contract is getting more and more difficult (referred to here as hierarchical agreements).
We can find different works in the literature focused on the selection of governance structures for
implementing collaboration agreements (Pisano, 1989; Pisano and others, 1988; Osborn and Baugh,
1990; Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998). In all of these papers, the basic underlying
framework is borrowed from Transaction Cost Analysis. The basic assumption here is that contracts
have limitations when they have to deal with intense interdependencies (Gulati and Singh, 1998) or
when payoffs are difficult to assign ex-ante and verify ex-post, thus creating appropriability hazards
(Oxley, 1997). Therefore, in certain cases, it is more efficient (i.e., it has lower transaction costs) to
substitute or complement contracts with some of the principles and rules associated with the hierarchy
system (administrative controls, formal coordination units, authority links)5.
                                                       
5 As it is often the case, we consider the transaction costs as the explicit costs of the selected structure. We are not taking
into account the residual losses, defined as the difference between the potential benefit and the obtained benefit with the
selected structure.
9However, the Transaction Cost Theory presents some limitations: accurate predictions about the
structure of the collaboration arrangement when there are R&D activities implied in the relationship are
not fully accomplished. Due to the fact that R&D activities usually show intense interdependencies and
payoff uncertainty, Transaction Cost generally anticipates structures closer to hierarchy. Nevertheless,
some empirical studies have not found this relationship at all (Rialp and Salas, 1999).
If governance structure moves away from the market, then the hybrids will be the considered
governance structures, and price becomes less and less important: what is going to be the main aspect?
Ownership. In a world where price can be fixed, ownership is irrelevant. But when the price cannot be
fixed, the allocation of decision rights (ownership) matters in terms of incentives, for example,
incentives to invest more or less ex-ante in specific assets6, and in terms of results allocation.
In the property rights framework (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995),
governance forms can be classified according to how residual-decision rights are allocated:
· Ownership of the assets related to the activity can be distributed among all the parties
(separated ownership).
· If each of the parties has veto power over the use of the assets, the governance is known as joint
ownership.
· If the residual-decision rights are allocated to a third party not directly involved in the activity
(a third party arbitration is contemplated to resolve disputes), the governance form is known as
trilateral governance.
· When all assets involved in the activity belong to one of the parties, we refer to single
ownership because the decision rights are concentrated in only one party.
                                                       
6 To hold decision rights over the non-human assets of the transaction means to have rights to decide on any non-anticipated
contingency. In this regard, to be the “owner” of an asset is to hold the residual-decision rights on the asset.
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Aghion and Tirole (1994a, 1994b) attempted to explain how the allocation of property rights of the
innovations could affect both the frequency and the magnitude of these innovations. In fact, they were
trying to open the “black box” of innovation. Our proposal here is that Property Rights Theory could
not be sufficient for explaining the selected structure for developing the relationship among
Technological Centers and firms. We will prove that variables related to expectations of future rents
should be considered in the analysis.
Mixing governance structures between markets and hierarchies from transaction costs economics
(contractual and hierarchical agreements) and from the theory of property rights, the governance forms
available for developing relationships among TC and firms can be described as follows: see Figure 17.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Contractual agreements with separated ownership. This governance structure performs well for
activities presenting all or some levels of the following attributes: the degree of specificity of
the assets is low, the degree of incompleteness and ambiguity is acknowledged but it is not very
significant, the period related to the execution of the activity is relatively short or it is not very
frequent, to assess the result is relatively simple and high interrelations are not presented. As we
can observe, it is a little bit more difficult to fix a price but a quite complete contract can be
written. It is a governance form closer to the classical contract or pure-market exchange.
Contractual agreements provide a framework under which the activity will take place. The
ownership of the assets is separated among the parties, but the contract may include safeguards
                                                       
7 This classification is based on the governance structure typology proposed by Rialp and Salas (2000).
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for the transacting parties in the form of information disclosure clauses, penalties for certain
behavior, explicit dispute-resolution mechanisms (in some cases arbitration), etc8.
Hierarchical agreement with joint ownership. These agreements are used when the specificity of
the assets becomes relevant, the relation among the parties is foreseen quite long, the level of
uncertainty is important, assessments of the results becomes difficult and interrelations are
observable. Situations are able to be found here where the ownership of the assets in the activity
is the result of holding ownership rights over the assets of the collaborating firms themselves
(the clearest example is minority equity interest through cross-shareholdings9, where the firms
may also exchange seats in their respective boards of directors), as much as situations where the
holder of the decision rights has individual veto power over the use of the assets involved in the
collaboration. Such assets are clearly segregated and placed in a legally separated entity where
they are administrated under this ownership condition. A joint venture with 50 – 50 equity
holdings of the two parties is a clear example of joint ownership, although the veto condition
can also be instrumented contractually, independently of equity holdings. The fact that a new
firm is created suggests that the joint venture substitute the market for the hierarchy.
In the empirical part we present four real cases of relationship between TC and firm where the selection
of the structures mentioned above could be analyzed. The question is: When should each one of these
governance structures be selected for managing the relationship between TC and firms? Due to the fact
that the classification of governance structures is based on Transaction Cost, complemented with the
Property Right Theory, the selection of one of these governance forms should be explained basically by
both theories. However, we believe the explanation must go beyond these theories: instead of
considering the transaction cost perspective, and the effects of the assignment of property rights, we
                                                       
8 A detailed comparison between Classical and Neoclassical contracting is found in MacNeil (1974, 1978). Alternatively,
see also Williamson (1991, p. 271-273; 1985, p. 70-72).
9Depending upon the size of the equity holdings and the statutory or contracted provisions, the holder of the minority
interest will have more or less influence on the decision process affecting the control and management of the collaboration.
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shall also consider the Transactional Value perspective. Under this perspective, the selection of one
structure is more a function of anticipated value gains rather than anticipated losses due to the cost of
constraining opportunism. A firm’s inclination to act opportunistically is often dominated by the firm’s
estimation of the negative impact that the opportunistic behavior will have on the value of expected
future exchanges with its partner (Zajac and Olsen, 1993, p. 137).
As Zajac and Olsen (1993) recognize, the Transaction Cost perspective presents two limitations: on one
hand, a single-party cost minimization emphasis, neglecting the interdependence between exchange
partners in the pursuit of joint value; on the other, an over-emphasis on the structural features that
neglects important process issues. Transactional Value framework considers joint value maximization,
rather than single-firm cost minimization, and the process by which exchange partners create and claim
value. Therefore, under this approach, the crucial issue in a collaboration is not merely a single
organization’s concern for minimizing its transaction costs, but rather both organizations’ concern for
knowing the partner’s preferences as a basis for exchanging and mutual gain. Furthermore, they would
like to discover ways in which similarities or shared interests can be exploited to maximize cooperative
joint gains that accrue to both parties.
Under the Transactional Value framework, the selected structure for managing the relationship between
TC and firm should be the one maximizing the net value of the collaboration for all of the parties. This
criteria could be positioning us far away from the structure that should be selected under the criteria of
transaction cost and/or property rights theories: selecting the most efficient structure. As Zajac and
Olsen (1993) and Stinchcombe (1985) show, the pursuit of greater joint value could require the use of
governance structures that are less efficient from a transaction cost perspective.
Note, however, that while the Transactional Value approach represents an alternative framework, it is
consistent with the implicit intent of the Transaction Cost theory in some ways. Transaction costs are a
subset of total costs to be aggregated and compared with the set of total benefits/gains in an overall
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calculation of the value of the collaboration.  In this value, the second aspect related to the approach of
the Transaction Value (to consider the process by which exchange partners create and claim value)
becomes relevant, because it can result in a transformation that leads to greater expected net benefits
for both parties.
It follows, then, that the type of analysis required is one that addresses how parties attempt to create
and claim value within a relationship over time (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Although in this paper the
focus is the net value related to a TI collaboration between TC and firms, we shall to upset this
collaboration process following the three temporal stages identified by Zajac and Olsen (1993):
Initializing stage: individual firms estimate the expected value that they foresee as accompanying a TI
collaboration because the first rounds of exchange are produced at this stage (therefore, a more accurate
calculation of value can be reached because the various components of the relationship become better
known and understood). Perceptions of value from the partners’ point of view also emerge in this stage,
and firms engage in the process of projecting exchange into the future (MacNeil, 1983) and
constructing net present assessments of alternative collaborations. Firms’ behaviors at this stage can set
a precedent for future exchange and provide useful information to learn about the expected behavior of
the partners.
Processing stage: value-creating exchanges in the relationship are expected to occur. These exchanges
occur simultaneously over multiple pathways. The level of actual value becomes clearer but, at this
stage, value is not only created: it is also claimed and distributed among partners. Surrounding the
issues of claiming and distributing value important elements as conflict, negotiation power and
temporal horizon are found. A perceived compensated distribution of the value among the partners,
obviously affected by their negotiation power, decreases the conflict issues, defined here as the
perceived divergence of interest (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). As a consequence, there is no obstacle to
value maximization, which increases the likelihood of a cooperative relationship over multiple rounds;
14
in other words: an extension of the exchange horizon and a subsequent reduction in incentives for
uncooperative behaviors (Axelrod, 1984) is produced. Partners feel a growing confidence in the
expectations of the future, trust is being developed, and they can behave as if the expected value of
interdependent activity were stable over the course of an uncertain future.
Reconfiguring stage: this stage is characterized by changes in the partners’ perceived level of the
relationship’s value. Such changes may emerge from comparing actual to expected value creation or
from a new and/or changing environment. Reconfiguring may imply that partners choose to exit the
relationship, but it may also mean that partners will choose to link their interdependence more tightly
by widening the scope of parallel collaboration processes. Therefore, the reconfiguring stage may only
involve a change in the process of interaction within the existing collaboration. This stage will typically
loop back to the initializing stage (value forecasts are re-specified) or the processing stage (where the
forms of exchange are revised).
Therefore, considering the previous arguments, the main proposal of this paper is that the selected
governance structure for implementing TI collaborations agreements is not always explained under the
Transaction Cost and/or Property Rights frameworks. It is necessary to consider relational aspects such
as the expected value, negotiation power or temporal horizon, in other words, the Transaction Value
Theory, for understanding the final selection.
2. EMPIRICAL SECTION
2.1. METHODOLOGY
For obtaining initial evidence about the assumption presented, we use qualitative methodology research
in this paper. More precisely, we use an embedded case study. Yin (1989) distinguishes between single
case study  vs. multiple case study (one main unit of analysis vs. more than one). Furthermore, he
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distinguishes between holistic case study (with one main subunit of analysis) vs. embedded case study
(with one or more subunits of analysis inside the main one.). As we have said, a single case study with
different subunits inside is presented here.
We know that to use this methodology implies that it is not possible to generalize the results in the
same way as if quantitative methodology research were being used. The generalization depends on the
purpose and the research design as much as in the methodological qualities of the case due to the
results derived from the analysis. Yin (1989, 1998) distinguishes between statistic generalization vs. an
analytical one: use the case study for representing or generalizing a theory. The idea is that the results
of a case study can be generalized to other cases with similar theoretical conditions.
Maxwell (1996, 1998) points out the components of a case studies: purposes (which are the main
purposes with the study); conceptual context (which are the theoretical backgrounds guiding the study);
research questions (what we want to understand from the study); methods (what is done for running the
study); validity (what the possible mistakes are). Eisenhardt (1989) specifies what the stages related to
theory-building are using research based on case studies as well as the activities to develop in each
stage. The stages are the following: choose the case/s, design the instruments and protocols, do the
groundwork, analyze the data, build the hypothesis and review the literature. Yin (1989, 1998) also
identifies the different phases related  to the design and execution of these kinds of studies: determine
the purpose of the research, establish theoretical models and the resources for running the research,
design the research, define and select the unit of analysis, collect and analyze the data and develop the
main conclusions of the study. We have followed the stages proposed by Yin in our research.
In the design stage of the research we have adopted a logical sequence connecting the empirical data
with our initial questions and, later on, with the conclusions. Due to the fact that we want to obtain
some kind of robust conclusions, we need to apply the triangulation concept (the evidence related to
the case is robustly established when it comes from different sources). One of the attributes of the case
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study letting us obtain construction validity is to use different evidence sources. We have used written
information as well as information coming from in-depth interviews with more than one of the agents
participating in the relationships.
Finally, internal validity has been obtained through explanation building (due to the fact the study
presents only one case, we tried to observe if data go through a logical sequence of the events that
seems to explain the results of the case) instead of using the well-known pattern matching procedure
(to compare an empirical pattern against a pre-defined one) or the analysis of temporary series; and
reliability is obtained because the same protocol was used for each subunit related to the case: the
proposal by the TC that must be signed by the client if he agrees with the specifications presented
there.
2.2. DATA SOURCE
2.2.1. ASCAMM Technological  Center (ATC)
The ASCAMM Technological  Center (ATC), a project hosted by the ASCAMM Association10,  has
become, since its start-up in 1987, a key reference for the tooling and machining industry in Spain, with
total assets on the order of 1,300 million pesetas and over 60 collaborators.
The main purpose of this Foundation is “to foster the economy by promoting and stimulating, primarily
in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia (Northeast Spain), the improvement of the competitive
standing of companies via technological development, quality, innovation and internationalization in
the moulds and dies sector in particular, and in the metal-mechanical and plastics transformation and
other related industries in general, providing the services necessary to achieve such ends”.
                                                       
10 As a business association, ASCAMM (The Catalonian Association of Mould and Die Manufacturers) was already
established in 1979.
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ATC’s organizational structure is made up of by two main sets of divisions which are clearly
identifiable: the innovation and technology division and other support divisions11. The basic goal of the
innovation and technology division is to contribute to improving competitiveness of those companies
belonging to the mould and die sector and, in general, to the metal-mechanical and plastics
transformation sectors, by promoting innovation and actively supporting technological developments.
The achievement of this goal rests on three major lines of action, with a primarily industrial orientation
within this internal division: a) R&D and Technological Innovation; b) Technological Services and c)
Training issues.
Two kinds of projects are clearly distinguishable inside the R&D and Technological Innovation: R&D
and technological transfer projects and support activities to firms. The former has, as its major
activities, the generation or assimilation of new technologies by the Center itself (generic research),
such as high-speed machining and rapid tooling; the conception and execution of projects in
cooperation with other research centers and companies (pre-competitive research) including, for
instance, the design of CAE Software for die simulations; high-technological content innovative
product and process development projects carried out jointly with an industrial partner company
(competitive research) such as, for example, an application study of gas injection in large pieces, and
several other diffusion and technology transfer activities carried out from this know-how. In addition to
the R&D programs and dissemination or technology transfer actions, ACT offers a wide range of
support activities to companies on a one-to-one basis in order to facilitate their access to databases and,
specially, to the R&D and innovation programs offered by the various government administrations.
EUROIT, REDAUTO, XARDEC and OPTI projects are outstanding examples of this issue.
                                                       
11  For example, the ATC’s Testing Laboratory that allows the testing of moulds in real operating conditions, to check their
performance before introducing them into production processes and to optimize injection-process conditions. The most
fundamental aspects of the Laboratory’s activities are: technological improvements, the quality control system and
improvement of customer needs of information and staff training.
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Inside Technological services ASCAMM strives to make new design, manufacturing and dimensional
quality control technologies available to industrial companies in the metal-machining and plastics
transformation sectors, especially mould and die companies, offering them the opportunity to learn
about and apply these technologies without requiring their immediate implementation in the company,
so that they may be evaluated in current services and projects12. Hence, new techniques and
technologies can be tested practically in real-life situations while their results and efficiency are
conveniently assessed. This support to industrial companies has been intensified mainly, but not
exclusively, by means of assistance to product-engineering and to process- and manufacture-
engineering. This department has also turned into a basic tool for promoting technology transfer,
allowing companies access to new technology without resorting to immediate investments. Also, with
the object of improving services offered to companies and covering the needs of the market, some of
the technical equipment available in this department has been recently upgraded. The improved
hardware and software have also been complemented by the incorporation of highly qualified staff.
2.2.2. Unit analysis: the contracts.
The contracts we shall analyze are a representative sample of the most usual situations among
ASCAMM and its clients for developing TI activities. More precisely, we shall analyze four contracts
with some common characteristics: all of them have an explicit price for the innovation created by the
Technological Center (TC), delivery date is specified and the conditions are also explicit. The question,
then, would be: if the contracts seem to be completed, where is the interest in analyzing them?
                                                       
12The most relevant services that the ATC’s Technological Services Department is currently offering are: product
engineering (integral development of plastic pieces using CAD, CAE tools), process and manufacturing engineering (metal
and plastic transformation using CAM, CAE), technical and technological assessment and consulting program and
dimensional metrology services
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ASCAMM suggested the contracts, arguing that they have the most representative characteristics of the
TI agreements among the TC and firms in general. Once the contracts had been studied, we believe the
selection made will lead us to interesting reflections.
Two first contracts, close to technological services, differ in the way the final agreements have been
reached. In the first one, the client says nothing to the TC offer. In the second one, renegotiations
appear about the initially offered conditions. Considering more aspects, both contracts are similar
because they are quite complete, the TC has the intellectual property of the innovation and the firm
does not call for confidentiality.
In the third contract the client calls for confidence and also for the intellectual property of the product
innovation. Although in this contract the price and the delivery date are fixed, we detect more specific
investments and uncertainty due to the fact that the client does not belong to the same sector where the
TC acts. Therefore, ASCAMM might  not have the required experience for reaching the optimum
result.
A different element of the fourth contract is the bigger involvement of the client in the project. More
uncertainty is also detected, in this case identified by the difficulty of fixing a date when each stage of
the R&D project should finish and the price for each one of them. In Table 1 the main characteristics of
the four projects are summarized.
Insert Table 1 about here
2.3. CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
Can we justify the governance form in each case only considering the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT)?
And only considering the Property Rights Theory (PRT)? Are these theoretical frameworks enough for
justifying the observed contractual solution?
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2.3.1. Transaction Cost Theory perspective.
Considering the TCT (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975), we wish to test whether the contractual form
comes conditioned by aspects such as the specificity of the assets, the frequency and duration of the
activity, the uncertainty, the difficulties for assessing the results and interrelations between activities.
- Presence of specific investments
Specific investments that could imply larger transaction costs can be detected in the third contract
because the developed activity is not habitual for ASCAMM. Therefore, the results cannot be directly
applied by the firms belonging to the sector where ASCAMM gives service in a regular way.
In the other three cases, ASCAMM is applying technology and knowledge that come from its internal
research activity. Furthermore, and as a general rule, these activities are usually financed through
public resources (the state, the regional government or European Union). As a consequence, neither the
TC nor the client must make specific investments in the activities they contract (services and
technological developments).
- Frequency and duration of the activity
Between the firm and the TC a long term relationship could appear, due to the association of the firm to
the Center or because the firm becomes a habitual client. However, if we focus on the four projects, the
TC considers that the kind of activity which has been contracted with difficulty will be contracted again
with the same client. That is why we consider that in the contracts between ASCAMM and the firms,
the frequency and duration of the activities are not going to be a source of transaction costs.
- Uncertainty
In the first two contracts, the presence of an explicit compromise of ASCAMM to deliver the
innovation with specific characteristics on a precise date is a signal of the almost null presence of
technical risk. As we have mentioned in the descriptive section, some elements of the third and fourth
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contracts would be indicative of some degree of uncertainty. Under the TCT, this degree of uncertainty
should lead us towards more hierarchical governance forms.
- Difficulties in assessing the results
In the third contract, although a date is fixed for delivering the innovation, to preview the value of the
innovation ex–ante will be more difficult than in the two previous contracts. The reasons that could be
argued are basically two: the client belongs to a different sector than the TC and/or the TC has to face a
project without previous experience. The intrinsic difficulty of the fourth project makes foreseeing the
value of the innovation complex.
- Interrelation with other activities
Considering the description of the contracts and the thoughts of the ASCAMM managers, the contracts
cannot be related to other projects developed among the firms asking for the services and the TC. As a
consequence, this aspect will not be a source of transaction costs.
2.3.2. Property rights perspective.
Following the PRT framework (Grossman and  Hart, 1986; Hart and  Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), the
uncertainty of the technological innovation activities, plus the existence of some non-verifiable
variables, could imply that any mistake assigning the property rights bears the apparition of
contractual inefficiencies (Aghion and Tirole, 1994a,b). We shall analyze what the implications of the
assignment of the residual rights in the considered contracts, the contributions of the partners and the
distribution of the results of the project are.
- Assignment of the residual rights
As a rule, the TC decides on its participation in the project (what it has to do, how and when), during
the days the project is going on. On the other hand, the firms have a different level of implication in the
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four cases. In the first two, the firms just validate the results and then they decide if they will pay or
not. In the third contract the firm gives a more precise orientation about what the new product must
accomplish13 (what application it is going to have, what its useful life must be, its production costs,...),
however, the firm is going to take no decisions during the project. Finally, in the fourth contract, the
firm participates actively in different stages of the process, taking some joint decisions with the TC.
- Contribution of the partners
The TC will contribute with its technological resources and knowledge for developing the activities
that shall end with the innovation by the fixed date. None of the analyzed cases are going to allow the
firms to verify the intensity and quality of the efforts of the TC. These characteristics are not relevant in
the first two contracts due to the fact that the value of the innovation can be approached more easily
than in the third and fourth contracts.
The firm will contribute with the required information by the TC for helping to obtain the innovation
and will contribute financially  (it will pay the TC). Furthermore, in the fourth contract, the firm will
contribute with its knowledge during the development of the project.
- Distribution of the results of the project
The TC obtains the fixed price and the intellectual property of the innovations in the first two contracts
and also in the fourth one. In these cases, the firms obtain the incomes derived from the innovation,
although not exclusively because the firms do not ask for a confidentiality clause. As we have
mentioned, these incomes can be understood as reductions in the cost of the manufacturing process
because they are three process innovations.
In the third contract, the TC only receives the price because the intellectual property rights are assigned
to the firm, which obtains the income of the innovation exclusively because it has the confidentiality
                                                       
13 That is reasonable because it is the first time that it has contacted the Technological Center.
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clause of the product innovation. Following Aghion and Tirole (1994a,b), this aspect could imply
contractual inefficiency (less investment in efforts by the TC side) that leads to sub-optimum result.
3. DISCUSSION
After the previous contractual analysis, two aspects are considered: a) the explanatory capacity of the
TCT and PRT frameworks; b) the heterogeneity related with TI activities.
Following the framework presented in the theoretical background, the four contracts fit with the
contractual agreement with separated ownership. However, in Table 2 it can be seen how the
characteristics of the third and fourth contracts should lead towards a different governance form. Under
the TCT perspective, both agreements should be closer to the hierarchical governance form. Based
upon the PRT framework, the third contract could reach a sub-optimum result.
In the first two contracts transaction costs do not present an important impact, so we are moving
towards agreements close to the market, where the relevant element is the price (as has been justified in
the descriptive section). Although in the second contract some renegotiations of contractual aspects
appear, which could imply higher transaction costs, the absence of conflict among the TC and the firm
implies that the increase of the transaction costs are not significant. Furthermore, the possibility of
fixing a price, plus the basically null level of uncertainty, allows us to consider that the agreements
have to be closer to complete contracts and, therefore, the property rights assignment is not going to
influence in their efficiency.
Insert Table 2 about here
With these two contracts we are not able to refuse the explanatory capacity of TCT and PRT in the
selection of governance structures. However, the following idea can be reinforced: amplifying the term
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of technological innovation to the Oslo Handbook’s (1997) arguments, close the contracts is possible
(because uncertainty is relative) and hierarchical forms do not need to appear. Therefore, the traditional
result that we find in the literature (Oxley, 1997; Gulati, 1995) could not be accomplished under some
circumstances. Firms can innovate technologically without entering directly in R&D activities, so risk
is lower (it happens in the two services considered). Furthermore, talking also about R&D activities, it
should be pointed out whether we are considering basic research (whose uncertainty could be really
important) or technological development (where the risk could be under more control). Taking these
aspects into account, results in the literature could have been very different.
In the third contract, both theoretical frameworks lead us to erroneous conclusions. Following TCT,
uncertainty and difficulties in assessing potential innovation should address themselves towards the
hierarchical solution. This fact is not observed because in the agreement the partners maintain the
separated ownership structure. Under the PRT framework, uncertainty and the impossibility of
verifying the TC efforts should imply the assigning of the property rights to the TC: its marginal effort
is higher14. However, in this project the firm calls for, and gets, the intellectual property. This result,
following the PRT arguments, should signify an inefficient result because the TC would not optimize
its efforts. Contradicting this argument, we suggest that the TC will look for maximum effort because it
is interested in the optimum value of the innovation, although it does not have the property rights.
The managers of ASCAMM pointed out that in this agreement strategic interests were really very
important. They wanted to establish future relationships with the new client. Under a theoretical
perspective, the TC expects future benefits of the relationship larger than the future benefits that could
be generated through the patent. Furthermore, as another element reinforcing the previous one, we
would like to remind that the client belongs to a different sector than the one where the TC belongs.
                                                       
14 It is a reasonable assumption because it has the technological knowledge and develops all of the project.
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Therefore, the patent, in the case of remaining in the hands of the TC, could have been applied to its
usual clients and affiliates with difficulty.
The perception of greater future benefits, if the TC passes the property rights to the firm, disciplines the
TC to make the maximum effort. Therefore, the result of the agreement tends to be more efficient,
although the governance structure does not correspond to the one suggested by TCT and/or PRT.
Behind this argument related to the future benefit of the relationship, or the transaction, the framework
presented in the theoretical section of the paper: the Transactional Value Theory  (TVT), is found.
Finally, the analysis of the fourth contract does not imply any  conflict with the PRT because the agent
possessing the higher marginal efficiency (the TC) has the property rights in a context with uncertainty
and non-verifying efforts. However, the TCT would suggest a more hierarchical governance structure
due to the cost related to the transaction. As we observe, although some uncertainty and difficulties for
assessing the innovation are in the project, they remain under the agreement with separated ownership.
We are faced with a clear R&D cooperation (the client gives something more than money in the
agreement), but the project does not go towards joint ownership.
In this case, the PRT would be useful for explaining the contractual solution. That is why our
suggestion of considering the TVT for analyzing agreements with a technological innovation
component is not exclusive but complementary. Our proposal is an analytic framework where TVT
proposals will be integrated into the principles of TCT and PRT, also considering some aspects coming
from the literature on technological change (due to the specific context we are considering). Therefore,
the governance structure that will be implemented in a cooperation for innovating will be more or less
hierarchical, and more or less complete, depending on the following components:
1. Project attractiveness: it depends on the expected value of the project and the related uncertainty.
Furthermore, these two variables would move according to sector aspects (demand of the product,
technological opportunity and ownership conditions) and also the kind of innovative activity
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contracted (basic research, applied, technological development, technological services, formation
and/or design).
2. The relative positions of the partners: these positions depend on the negotiation power among
parties. This is a function of financial and technological resources and knowledge.
3. The future perspective of the relationship (or dynamic perception of the relationship). This
aspect could motivate the property rights assignment to have no effect on the efficiency due to
confidence and future reputation or benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
After the discussion section, we would like to state two main conclusions. First, we believe we need to
break with the direct association between uncertainty and R&D and technological innovation. It will
allow us to develop a more rigorous analysis of reality. This shall allow us to observe results that fit
better with the TCT proposals (Oxley, 1997; Gulati, 1995). Furthermore, it will contribute to
convincing the firms (basically small and medium firms) about the goodness of these activities because
it will relativize the uncertainty related to technological activity.
Secondly, although we take into account the precision related to R&D, some limitations exist on the
TCT and PRT frameworks that do not allow some contractual structures. A theoretical structure
considering the spirit of the TVT and based on variables such as the project attractiveness, the relative
position of the partners and the future perspective of the relationship would complement the traditional
theoretical frameworks (TCT and PRT), but it also allows for considering dynamic aspects in the
analysis.
The limitations of this study open, from our point of view, future research paths. First of all, we believe
that to test the theoretical framework, presented in Section One, with data from some cases where the
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contracts were non-complete (with a variable price and without delivery date) would allow us for the
reinforcing of the theory. We have to say that this extension is being worked on with information from
projects coming from different TCs. Likewise, to test this theoretical proposal in other context, for
example, relationships between firms or between firms and Universities, is also needed for proving its
validity. Secondly, we propose to use large data bases to contrast some intuitions that have appeared in
the analysis about the relevance of the property rights depending upon whether the innovation is in
product or in process, the tendency to cooperate with TC, the sector of the firm and/or its level of
previous knowledge. Our thoughts are:
- The firm is less worried about property rights if the innovation is in process.
- More cooperation with the TC exits in sectors with more spillovers.
- Firms without an R&D department are less worried about property rights.
28
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1994a). “The Management of Innovation”, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 109, pp. 1.185-1.209.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1994b). “Opening the black box of Innovation”, European Economic
Review, Vol. 38, pp. 701-710.
Arrow, K. J. (1969): "The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market
versus Non market Allocation" en The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expediture: The PPB System,
Vol. 1, U.S. Joint Economic Commitee, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 47-64. Washington: U.S.
Goverment Printing Office.
Axelrod, R. (1984): The Evolution of Cooperation. New York, Basic Books.
Coase, R. (1937): "The Nature of the Firm". Economica, nº 4, p. 386 - 405.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989): “Building Theories from Case Study Research”. Academy of Management
Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 532-550.
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration”. Journal of Political Economy, 94, p. 691 - 719.
Gulati, R. (1995): "Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual
Choice in Alliances". Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 38,  1, p. 85 - 112.
Gulati, R. and Singh, H. (1998): “The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination Cost and
Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances”. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, p. 781 – 814.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”. 98 Journal of Political
Economy 1119 – 1158.
Hart. O. (1995): Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
29
Imai, K. and Itami, H. (1984): "Interpenetration of Organization and Market". International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 2, p. 285 - 310.
Klein, B.; Crawford, R.A. and Alchian, A. A. (1978): “Vertical Integration, Appropiable Rents and the
Competitive Contracting Process”. Journal of Law and Economics, 21. Pag. 297 – 326.
Lax, D. and Sebenius, J.K. (1986): The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and
Competitive Gain. New York. Free Press.
Macneil, I. R. (1974): “The Many Features of Contracts”. Southern California Law Review, 47, p. 691
– 816.
Macneil, I. R. (1978): “Contracts: Adjustments of Long - Term Economic Relations under Classical,
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law”. Northwestern University Law Review, 72, p. 854 - 906
Macneil, I.R. (1983): “Values in Contract: Internal and External”. Northwestern University Law
Review, 78. 2, p. 340 – 418.
Maxwell, J. A. (1996): Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Sage Publications,
Thousand Oaks.
Maxwell, J. A. (1998): “Designing a Qualitative Study”. In Bickman, L. and Rog, D. J. (Eds.):
Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, p. 69-100.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1992): Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice-Hall.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
OCDE (1997), Oslo Manual. Proposed guidelines for collecting and interpreting.
Osborn, R. N. and Baughn, C. C. (1990): "Forms of Interorganizational Governance for Multinational
Alliances". Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 33,  3, p. 503 - 519.
30
Oxley, J. E. (1997): “Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: a Transaction
Cost Approach”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 13,  2, p. 387 – 409.
Padmore, T., Schuetze, H. and Gibson, H. (1998), “Modelling systems of innovation: An enterprise-
centered view”, Research Policy, Vol. 26, pp. 605-624.
Pisano, G. P. (1989): "Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the
Biotechnology Industry". Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 5,  1, p. 109-126.
Pisano, G. P.; Russo, M. V. and Teece, D. (1988): “Joint Ventures and Collaborating Agreements in the
Telecommunication Equipment Industry” in International Collaborative Ventures in U.S.
Manufacturing, D. Mowery (ed.). Cambridge, MA.
Pruitt, D.G. and Rubin, J.Z. (1986): Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. New York,
Random House.
Rialp, J. and Salas, V. (1999). “On the selection of governance structures for interfirm collaboration”.
Paper presented in the Annual Session of the Academy of Management, Chicago. August.
Rialp, J. y Salas, V. (2000): “The Cost of Ownership in the Governance of Interfirm Collaborations”.
Working paper nº 2000/1. Departament d’Economia de l’Empresa, UAB.
Schumpeter, J. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University Press.
Stinchcombe, A. (1985): “Contracts as Hierarchical Documents”. In Stinchcombe, A. and Heimer, C.
Organization Theory and Project Management. Oslo:  Norwegian University Press.
Stoneman, P. (1983). The Economic Analysis of Technological Change. Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies, New York, NY: The Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, NY: The Free Press.
31
Williamson, O. E. (1991): "Comparative Economic Organization. The Analysis of Discrete Structural
Alternatives". Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36,  2, p. 269-296.
Yin, R. K. (1989): Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Sage Publications, Newbury Park.
Yin, R. K. (1998): “The Abridged Version of Case Study Research”. In Bickman, L. and Rog, D. J.
(Eds.): Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, p. 229-259.
Zajac, E. J. and Olsen, C. P. (1993): “From Transaction Cost to Transactional Value Analysis:
Implications for the Study of Interorganizational Strategies”. Journal of Management Studies, 30: 1.
January, p. 131 – 145.
32
Figure 1. Typology of Governance Forms
Transaction Cost
Theory
Market Hybrids Hierarchy
Contractual
structures
Hierarchical
structures
Mix Contractual agreement
with separated ownership
Hierarchical agreement
with joint ownerships
Property Rights
Theory  Separated ownership Joint ownership
Single
ownership
PRICE OWNERSHIP
-     Specificity of assets      +
-     Frequency / Duration     +
-     Uncertainty     +
-    Difficulties for assessing results
-     Interrelations     +
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Table 1: Main characteristics of each contract.
Aspects First Contract Second  Contract Third  Contract Fourth  Contract
Renegotiations NO YES YES YES
Confidential NO NO YES NO
Intellectual Property T.C. T.C. CLIENT T.C.
Client involvement in the
innovation process. NO NO NO YES
Uncertainty LOW LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM / HIGH
Kind of innovation PROCESS PROCESS PRODUCT PROCESS
Firms associated to TC YES YES NO YES
Specific investment NO NO YES (TC) NO
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Table 2: Contractual aspects from TCT and PRT.
First
Contract
Second
Contract
Third
Contract
Fourth
Contract
Specific investments WITHOUT INFLUENCE Couldinfluence
WITHOUT
INFLUENCE
Frequency and
duration of the activity WITHOUT INFLUENCE
Uncertainty WITHOUT INFLUENCE Couldinfluence
Could
influence
Difficulties in assessing
results WITHOUT INFLUENCE
Could
influence
Could
influence
Aspects that
could imply
more
hierarchical
structures.
Interrelation with
other activities WITHOUT INFLUENCE
Residual rights
assignment WITHOUT INFLUENCE
Contributions of the
partners WITHOUT INFLUENCE
Could
influence
WITHOUT
INFLUENCE
Aspects that
could imply
contractual
inefficiencies Distribution of the
results of the project WITHOUT INFLUENCE
Could
influence
WITHOUT
INFLUENCE
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